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Abstract- In order to prevent detection and evade signature-based scanning methods, which are normally exploited by anti-
virus softwares, metamorphic viruses use several various obfuscation approaches. They transform their code in new 
instances as look entirely or partly different and contain dissimilar sequences of string, but their behavior and function 
remain unchanged. This obfuscation process allows them to stay away from the string based signature detection. In this 
research, we use a statistical technique to compare the similarity between two files infected by two morphed versions of a 
given metamorphic virus. Our proposed solution based on static analysis and it uses the histogram of machine instructions 
frequency in various offspring of obfuscated viruses. We use Euclidean histogram distance metric to compare a pair of 
portable executable (PE) files. The aim of this study is to show that for some particular obfuscation methods, the presented 
solution can be exploited to detect morphed varieties of a file. Hence, it can be utilized by non-string based signature 
scanning to identify whether a file is a version of a metamorphic virus or not. 
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1 Introduction 
Today, metamorphic viruses are one of the most 
challenging issues in the context of computer security. 
Most of current anti-virus detector engines are generally 
based on syntactic features of viruses. They usually scan 
sequences of binaries in machine code level of files to 
find the signature of viral code. Syntactic characteristics 
make the anti-virus scanner vulnerable against the smart 
virus writers who are increasingly employing mutation 
techniques that change the byte strings of viruses 
syntactically, while the function and behavior of the 
virus will remain significantly unchanged [1]. 
 To overcome metamorphic viruses’ obfuscation 
techniques, semantic based features become into new 
anti-virus researches in recent years. The most crucial 
concern related to semantic methods is that it requires a 
large amount of prerequisites works. It normally takes a 
great deal of time to form a proper semantic signature. 
In addition, the semantic methods cannot be used on-
the-fly [2]. It is also considerable to notice that a 
method, which spends an unreasonable time to analyze 
and detect a mutated variation of a virus, is not 
practicable, even it be able to detect with high degree of 
accuracy. 
On the other hand, syntax based method or string 
signature strategy, need an incessantly updated database 
of virus signatures. Therefore, to keep a reliable and 
powerful database, a large amount of time of experts 
should be spent to extract signatures and produce 
database with as the most accurate data as possible [3]. 
However, all these efforts are confronted by obfuscation 
techniques and may be defeated easily. 
Metamorphic virus writers use different innovative 
morphing techniques to evade the signature-based 
analysis. Some common obfuscation skills used in this 
kind of viruses are 1) garbage code insertion, 2) register 
usage exchange, 3) instruction replacement, 4) 
instruction permutation and 5) Code Transposition 
[2,4,5,6,7]. 
In this paper, we use the histogram of instructions 
opcodes as a statistical feature to compare files. In this 
way, we attempt to find out that whether a file is a 
morphed version of another one or not. We believe that 
although obfuscation techniques apply many changes 
into shapes of different variants of a virus, there are still 
some essential common properties among these variants, 
which contain the key instructions indicating their 
correspondent functions. In other words, obfuscation 
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techniques are not able to remove statistical likelihood 
properties of two codes, totally, that are functionally 
similar.  
Next section presents some related works has been 
done, previously. In section 3, we review some of the 
most common obfuscation methods usually utilized by 
metamorphic virus authors. Our approach is introduced 
in section 4, and experiments and result are presented in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 gives the conclusion and a 
few recommendations for future works. 
 
 
2 Related Works 
In [8], Szor and Ferrie introduced a valuable definition 
of metamorphic viruses and evolution of the code. They 
also introduced some basic metamorphic virus detection 
methods, in general, following with many useful 
examples. 
Konstantinou, in his technical report [5], gave a 
comprehensive and detailed explanation for 
metamorphic viruses, obfuscation techniques and other 
advanced skills normally used by them. Then, he 
discusses about metamorphic virus detection methods, 
briefly. 
The method introduced in [1] is based on this 
concept that properties of malwares are positioned in 
their semantics. Preda et al in this paper recommended a 
semantics-based structure for malware detectors. Their 
approach uses trace semantics to distinguish the 
behaviors of malware while the program code is being 
inspected for infection. 
A helpful explanation of computer virus strategies 
and detection methods is accessible in [9] by authors. 
They explained static and dynamic detection 
approaches, mechanism of metamorphic virus engine 
and open problems in computer anti-virus technologies. 
 In [2], Karnik et al presented a method based on 
frequency of instructions using cosine similarity analysis 
to detect obfuscated viruses. 
Webster and Malcolm in [10] introduced an 
approach towards metamorphic computer virus detection 
by an algebraic specification of the IA-32 assembly 
programming language. Their proposed method based 
on a specification in OBJ of the IA-32 instructions. 
 
 
3 Obfuscation Techniques 
As mentioned in previous section, metamorphic viruses 
utilize different techniques to defeat string signature 
based detection. In fact, metamorphic virus is able 
reprogram itself to challenge deeper static analysis [9].  
In following, we review some of popular 
obfuscation techniques with examples of morphed 
codes, to understand how obfuscation may change the 
sequence of bytes in an executable to neutralize 
scanning. 
 
 
3.1 Garbage Code Insertion 
The simplest technique used by metamorphic engine to 
change the byte sequence of viral code is garbage code 
(or dead code) insertion. Inserted instruction has no 
effect on function of the code. There are different kinds 
of garbage code insertion. 
In Table 1, some sample dead codes are given [6], 
which are actually useless instructions and semantically 
equivalent to no operation (NOP). 
 
Table 1: Examples of Dead Codes 
 
None of the operation samples, in Table 1, changes 
value of the register. Adding a value 0 to a register or a 
variable, transferring a register value to itself, a logical 
OR operation of register or variable with a 0 and a 
logical AND operation of a register or variable with a 
same length register or variable filled by binary value 1, 
or immediate constant -1 will not affect on the execution 
process.  
In another kind of garbage code insertion, 
programmer inserts an instruction, which may changes 
the situation of machine, but before it involves the 
execution; programmer undoes it by one or more other 
instructions. Two examples are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Examples of Garbage Codes 
 
However, more mixed and complicated techniques 
of garbage code insertion can be used in metamorphic 
viruses. The following example is a piece of the 
Instruction Rule Operation 
add Reg, 0 Reg ← Reg + 0 
mov Reg, Reg Reg ← Reg 
or Reg, 0 Reg ← Reg  |  0 
and Reg, -1 Reg ← Reg & -1 
Garbage Instructions Comments 
push cx Before any effects, it returns the value to the register from 
stack pop cx 
inc ax Value of ax remain unchanged sub ax, 1 
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Win32.Evol virus [11]. Its metamorphic engine inserts 
junk instruction among the main instruction to change 
the byte string of the code. Two different offspring of 
Win32.Evol are shown in table 3 and Table 4: 
 
Table 3: Version 1 of Win32.Evol 
 
Table 4: Version 2 of Win32.Evol (junk insertion) 
 
As it can be obviously seen in tables 3 & 4, these 
two versions of the virus are completely different in 
looking, but their functions are same. Both transfer two 
double words into memory address specified by esi. 
The most noticeable point is that it is not possible to find 
a common sequence of bytes in both to use as a 
signature string of virus, even utilizing wildcards.   
 
 
3.2 Register/Variable Usage Exchange 
Usage of different registers or memory variables is 
another simple transformation method that metamorphic 
engines use it to mutate their code. This technique 
attempt to evade the string signature based detection as 
well, by changing similar bytes in various generations. 
In December 1998, Win95.Regswap utilized it to create 
different variants of the virus. It is clear that it does not 
influence on the function of the code, but the sequence 
of binaries will alter. Two various versions of 
Win95.Regswap are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 
[8,11]. 
Highlighted strings show the common bytes in two 
instances. The complexity of this method is not too high 
and such scanners that use wildcards are able to detect 
the variants of the virus easily, because there are enough 
similar byte sequences to extract a signature string.  
Table 5: Version 1 of Win95.Regswap 
 
Table 6: Version 2 of Win95.Regswap 
 
However, the combination of this technique with 
other methods such as dead code insertion can make 
new generations enough difficult to detect and make the 
syntax signature based detection entirely impossible. 
 
 
3.3 Instruction Replacement 
This obfuscation method actually substitutes some 
instructions with their equivalent instructions in newer 
copies. Sometimes, programmers can perform an action 
in different ways of coding. For example, to assign 0 to 
register eax, following codes are possible: 
mov eax, 0 
xor eax, eax 
and eax, 0 
sub eax, eax 
Therefore, this is a great opportunity for virus 
programmers to utilize this possibility in metamorphic 
engines. This method is like using different synonyms in 
human language [2]. 
The following codes, in Tables 7 and 8, show two 
versions of W95.Bistro taken from [4]. 
Some instructions or actions replaced by their 
equivalents. “test esi, esi” replaced by “or esi, 
esi”. Instruction “or edi, edi” replaced by “test 
edi, edi”, and finally, “mov ebp, esp” replaced by 
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
C7060F000055 mov [esi], 5500000Fh 
C746048BEC5151 mov[esi+0004],5151EC8Bh 
String Signature: C7060F000055C746048BEC5151 
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
BF0F000055 mov edi,5500000Fh 
893E mov [esi],edi 
5F pop edi 
52 push edx 
B640 mov dh,40 
BA8BEC5151 mov edx,5151EC8Bh 
53 push ebx 
8BDA mov ebx,edx 
895E04 mov [esi+0004],ebx 
String Signature:  
BF0F000055893E5F52B640BA8BEC5151538BDA895E04 
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
5A pop edx 
BF04000000 mov edi,0004h 
8BF5 mov esi,ebp 
B80C000000 mov eax,000Ch 
81C288000000 add edx,0088h 
8B1A mov ebx,[edx] 
899C8618110000 mov [esi+eax*4+00001118],ebx 
String Signature:  
5ABF040000008BF5B80C00000081C2880000008B1
A899C8618110000 
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
58 pop eax 
BB04000000 mov ebx,0004h 
8BD5 mov edx,ebp 
BF0C000000 mov edi,000Ch 
81C088000000 add eax,0088h 
8B30 mov esi,[eax] 
89B4BA1811000
 
mov [edx+edi*4+00001118],esi 
String Signature:  
58BB040000008BD5BF0C00000081C0880000008B3
089B4BA18110000 
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two consequent instructions “push esp” and “pop 
ebp”, which perform same action. As it is clear, these 
replacements transmute the sequence of instructions 
binary codes. Thus, the string signature for these two 
versions of W95.Bistro is dissimilar. Certainly, like the 
previous method, some parts of string signature are 
similar and wildcards can be used for detection. The 
identical bytes are colored in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
Table 7: Version 1 of Win95.Bistro 
 
Table 8: Version 2 of Win95.Bistro 
 
 
3.4 Instruction Permutation 
In some pieces of code, it is possible to change the 
sequence of instructions with no disturbing the 
execution. Byte strings in different versions of the code 
will appear unlike via this disordering technique.  
If there is no dependency among some instructions, they 
can be reordered. Consider the following instructions: 
   
  op1  Reg1, Reg2 
  op2  Reg3, Reg4 
If the below conditions are satisfied, these two 
instructions can be substituted [7]: 
1- Reg1 is not equal to Reg2 
2- Reg1 is not equal to Reg4 
3- Reg2 is not equal to Reg3 
For example, codes in two columns of Table 9 are 
equivalent and can be swapped, simply. 
 
Table 9: Example of Instruction Permutation 
 
 
3.5 Code Transposition 
This technique modifies the structure of the program in 
form of physically reordering of the program codes, 
while preserving the execution order or flow of the 
program running using conditional jumps or 
unconditional branches. It may be done at the level of 
instructions or modules. 
Fig. 1 shows an example of such code structure 
modification used in Zperm virus [8]. 
 
 
4 Proposed Methodology 
In some of the mentioned techniques, such as 
register/variable exchange or instruction permutation or 
even in some cases of code transposition, frequency of 
similar instructions is same in different generations of 
morphed viruses. Our proposed solution deals with the 
frequencies of opcodes used in variants as their features 
and measures the dissimilarity between two files 
according to these features. We expect that if the 
obfuscation engine utilizes some special kinds of 
morphing techniques, the frequencies of identical 
instructions are approximately similar. 
In addition, to achieve a better comparison, we 
breakdown the files into their building subroutines and 
compare two files according to their function blocks.  
We make an instruction frequency histogram for 
each code block or subroutine. Then we can evaluate 
dissimilarity of two blocks by measure the distance 
between their histograms. It can be done by different 
histogram distance measurements techniques introduced 
in data mining techniques. In fact, each subroutine of a 
program is presented by a histogram of the contained 
instructions as a feature, in form of a vector, which the 
length of vector is equal to the number of total 
instructions of the machine. If we were able to compare 
the histograms of the building blocks of two programs, 
then we will be able to calculate the dissimilarity 
between two programs using this feature.
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
55 push ebp 
8BEC mov ebp, esp 
8B7608 mov esi, dword ptr [ebp + 08] 
85F6 test esi, esi 
743B je 401045 
8B7E0C mov edi, dword ptr [ebp + 0c] 
09FF or edi, edi 
7434 je 401045 
31D2 xor edx, edx 
String Signature: 
558BEC8B760885F6743B8B7E0C09FF743431D2 
Binary Opcode Assembly Code 
55 push ebp 
54 push esp 
5D pop ebp 
8B7608 mov esi, dword ptr [ebp + 08] 
09F6 or esi, esi 
743B je 401045 
8B7E0C mov edi, dword ptr [ebp + 0c] 
85FF test edi, edi 
7434 je 401045 
28D2 sub edx, edx 
String Signature: 
55545D8B760809F6743B8B7E0C85FF743428D2 
Code Order 1 Code Order 2 
mov  eax, 0F add  esi, ebx 
push ecx mov  eax, 0F 
add  esi, ebx push ecx 
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Fig. 1: Example of Code Transposition in different generations  
 
  Therefore, if dissimilarity value between two programs 
is less than a specific threshold we can conclude these 
two programs are morphed versions of each other. By 
this way, we can classify different variants of a 
metamorphic virus, which use some special types of 
obfuscation techniques. It is significant to mention that 
we can use this approach in the cases which the applied 
obfuscation has no effects or small changes on the 
frequencies of instructions. 
 
 
4.1 Data Structure and Algorithm 
To measure the dissimilarity between two executable 
files, we follow two general steps. In first step, is a pre-
process, we prepare our input data in form of histograms 
as features. In the second step, which is a comparison 
process, we evaluate the dissimilarity of a pair of 
programs by comparison of their histograms. 
 In pre-process section, first, we disassemble 
executable files using IDA Pro 4.9 [12] and create 
assembly code files. Then, we analyze each assembly 
program and extract all procedures inside and save them 
as separate files. In next step, we create a set of 
histograms represent the frequencies of instructions 
within the procedures for each file. As a result, for each 
program, we will have a set of histograms, each one for 
a sub-procedure. Fig. 2 shows the process of program 
disassembly and breakdown into building subroutine 
blocks. 
In the second step, we compare two programs by the 
use of their sets of histograms. Our comparison method 
is similar to that proposed in [2] with some changes to 
improve the algorithm. The comparison algorithm works 
as follow: 
We have a set of histogram for each program. Each 
histogram driven for a subroutine inside the program and 
includes the frequency of each instruction in the 
subroutine. 
Given two programs P1 and P2, containing m and k 
subroutines, respectively. Therefore, P1 has m has m 
histograms and P2 has k histograms. Each histogram of 
P1 is compared with all histograms of P2. According to  
 
 
Fig. 2: Disassembly, breakdown and feature extraction 
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our distance metric introduced in next section; distance 
value for each comparison will be calculated. More 
precisely, histogram hi from P1 is compared with all 
histograms hj, 1 ≤ 𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 , from P2. That pair of 
histograms which has the minimum distance considered 
as the most similar histograms and consequently, we can 
consider their corresponding subroutines as mutated 
versions of each other. We save the minimum distance 
value for subroutine i. After all histograms of P1 
compared with all histograms of P2, we have a vector of 
length m, which contains the minimum distance values.  
We can use the average of this vector as the total 
distance value of P1 and P2. It is important to take 
notice that this distance value is not symmetric. It means 
distance(P1, P2) is not equal to distance(P2, P1). 
Hence, to get a more precise result, we define the 
distance of P1 and P2 as following: 
𝑑𝑑{𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2} = 𝑑𝑑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) + 𝑑𝑑(𝑃𝑃2,𝑃𝑃1)2               (1)  
Fig. 3 shows the process of comparison between two 
programs P1 and P2, briefly. 
 
 
4.2 Dissimilarity Metric 
There are various metric methods for measuring 
histogram dissimilarity and each of them has its 
application in related works. The first class of 
dissimilarity measurement is based on Minkowski-form 
distance metric [13]. Consider two vectors of size n,     
X = (x1,x2,…,xn)  and   Y = (y1,y2,…,yn), then the 
Minkowski-form distance between two vectors X and Y 
is calculated as: 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 = �|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 |𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1                        (2) 
One of the most popular histogram distance 
measurements is Euclidean form distance.  It is a 
Minkowski-form metric with r = 2, as following: 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 = �(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1                        (3) 
As shown in Fig. 4, histogram dissimilarity 
measures based on Minkowski-form compare only the 
parallel elements. It is appropriate for our case that the 
instructions opcodes are not related. 
In addition, because we are going to test different 
kinds of programs in our data set, as we explained in 5.2, 
to obtain a common threshold for classification, we 
normalized the histograms before we begin to calculate 
the distance values as following: 
 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1                                  (4) 
Normalization of histogram helps us to find a 
program independent threshold for our data set.
 
 
Fig. 3: Distance Calculation between two program P1 and P2 
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Fig. 4:  Minkowski-form distance metrics compare only 
identical bins between two histograms. 
 
 
5 Experiments and Findings 
We used MathWorks MATLAB R2008a [14] to carry 
out our experiments include of preparing the data 
structure and implementing the comparison algorithm, 
and distance calculation. 
 
 
5.1 Data Set 
In our test data, we used several different obfuscated 
versions of some popular metamorphic viruses retrieved 
from [15] and a number of randomly chosen benign 
programs. Viruses and legal programs used in the 
experiment are listed in Table 10. 
 An in detail investigation and analysis of 
Win32.Evol is given in [16]. 
 
 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 11 shows the comparison results for each pair of 
two files. Because we use the average of distance for P1 
and P2, the table is symmetric. 
The lower values indicate that programs are more 
similar. If the distance value is lower than a specified 
threshold, then we can conclude those two programs are 
obfuscated versions. Therefore, choosing the appropriate 
threshold value is critical. Choosing a low threshold 
value may cause to lose correct similar programs and 
over high threshold, value may produces false positive 
mistakes. We believe, in general, threshold value must 
be considered according to the case. For different 
viruses with not the same obfuscation techniques and 
morphing level, threshold values may be selected 
completely different. 
In the case of our study, distance values between 
each pairs of three versions of Evol virus are equal to 
zero. Anyway, if we use some other versions of this 
virus, maybe we have to choose a higher value to 
classify the other morphed instances of this virus. It is 
happened in the case of Evul virus variants. We should 
choose a threshold equal to 0.057 to classify the five 
versions of this virus. Highlighted cells show the 
distance less than threshold. Programs with highlighted 
distances are considered as morphed versions of each 
other. The other three instances of Evul are more 
different. Distance values for all versions of Evul are 
given in Table 12, separately. After we obtained the 
result, we analyze Evul Virus deeply, to find why other 
three instances have higher distance quantities. We find 
that in variants Evul.d, Evul.g and Evul.f, virus inserts 
nop instruction as dead code. For this reason, histograms 
of these versions are disparate and distance values are 
higher. 
 
Table 10: List of experiment files 
 
 
6 Conclusions and Future Works 
This study shows that the frequency histogram of 
opcodes can be considered as a feature to classify the 
obfuscated versions of metamorphic viruses. 
There are two major drawbacks with this method. 
Firstly, because a wide range of programs use some of 
the most common machine instructions and this method 
is highly depend on instruction frequency, is very 
difficult  to choose appropriate threshold to decrease the 
risk of false positive. Secondly, it works only for a 
Virus/Program Description/Application 
Win32.Evol.a/b/c Versions of virus Evol 
Win32.Evul. 
a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h Versions of virus Evul 
Lib.exe Microsoft Visual Studio 9.0 
Write.exe Windows 7 WordPad 
Wordconv.exe Microsoft office 2007 
Help.exe Windows 7 command line help 
Find.exe Windows 7 command line find 
Drvins32.exe Kaspersky Antivirus 2010 
Perlglob.exe Mathworks MatLab R2008a 
logoUI.exe Windows 7 
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limited range of obfuscation techniques. Some 
metamorphic methods, such as instruction substitution 
and junk code insertion, can defeat this classification 
methodology.  
For the future extension of this methodology, we can 
suggest some recommendations. One beneficial 
improvement is combining a weighted calculation to 
Minkowski-form distance metric. Some instructions, 
such as mov, push, call , and so on, are more using in 
programs. These kind of opcodes can be weighted to 
create a more precise distance metric.  
Another valuable development is to modify 
methodology to overcome the other obfuscation 
techniques that is not included in current solution. 
Before we start the comparison step to find dissimilarity 
between two programs, we can analyze the programs 
and their subroutines to prune dead code inserted or 
solve the issue of mutation via exchangeable instructions 
to obtain a uniform minimal core. It is obvious that this 
pre-process may increase the complexity of the 
algorithm, especially in aspect of the time.  
In addition, normalization of the histogram will 
eliminate the length of frequency vector. In this study, 
we had to normalize the histograms to achieve a 
threshold-based comparison for classification. However, 
a worthy study is to solve the threshold problem, 
eliminate the normalization of histogram, and compare 
the histograms in keeping with the number of opcodes, 
not according to proportion of frequency of opcodes. 
 
 
Table 11: Distance values and classification based on threshold equal to 0.057 
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Table 12: Distance values for all 8 versions of Evul. 
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